On May 3, 2020, The Roanoke Times published Del. Kilgore’s reflection on his push for HB1332 and the necessity of telehealth services during the current pandemic. Kilgore mentions the Tuesday Morning Group coalition in his letter Kilgore: Advancing telehealth in the Commonwealth.
On April 17th, Don Kroah interviewed VIPP President Lynn Taylor on the bills Gov Northam recently signed into effect. Listen to the radio show below.
Republished with permission from American Enterprise Institute.
Authors: Scott Gottlieb, Mark McClellan, Lauren Silvis, Caitlin Rivers, Crystal Watson.
Key Points
This report provides a road map for navigating through the current COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. It outlines specific directions for adapting our public-health strategy as we limit the epidemic spread of COVID-19 and are able to transition to new tools and approaches to prevent further spread of the disease. We outline the steps that can be taken as epidemic transmission is brought under control in different regions. These steps can transition to tools and approaches that target those with infection rather than mitigation tactics that target entire populations in regions where transmission is widespread and not controlled. We suggest measurable milestones for identifying when we can make these transitions and start reopening America for businesses and families.
In each phase, we outline the steps that the federal government, working with the states and public-health and health care partners, should take to inform the response. This will take time, but planning for each phase should begin now so the infrastructure is in place when it is time to transition.
The specific milestones and markers included in the report for transitioning our responses are judgments based on our current understanding, with the goal of facilitating an effective path forward. The epidemic is evolving rapidly, and our understanding of best responses will evolve as well. The broad set of tasks described here requires and will receive high-level, ongoing attention, and it should be updated and refined as additional evidence, context, and insights about the epidemic become available.
To gradually move away from a reliance on physical distancing as our primary tool for controlling future spread, we need:
Our stepwise approach depends on our ability to aggregate and analyze data in real time. To strengthen our public-health surveillance system to account for the unprecedented spread of COVID-19, we need to harness the power of technology and drive additional resources to our state and local public-health departments, which are on the front lines of case identification and contact tracing. Finally, we must expand our investments in pharmaceutical research and development into COVID-19 and promote the rapid deployment of effective diagnostics, therapies, and eventually a vaccine.
Slow the Spread in Phase I. This is the current phase of response. The COVID-19 epidemic in the United States is growing, with community transmission occurring in every state. To slow the spread in this period,1 schools are closed across the country, workers are being asked to do their jobs from home when possible, community gathering spaces such as malls and gyms are closed, and restaurants are being asked to limit their services. These measures will need to be in place in each state until transmission has measurably slowed down and health infrastructure can be scaled up to safely manage the outbreak and care for the sick.
State-by-State Reopening in Phase II. Individual states can move to Phase II when they are able to safely diagnose, treat, and isolate COVID-19 cases and their contacts. During this phase, schools and businesses can reopen, and much of normal life can begin to resume in a phased approach. However, some physical distancing measures and limitations on gatherings will still need to be in place to prevent transmission from accelerating again. For older adults (those over age 60), those with underlying health conditions, and other populations at heightened risk from COVID-19, continuing to limit time in the community will be important.
Public hygiene will be sharply improved, and deep cleanings on shared spaces should become more routine. Shared surfaces will be more frequently sanitized, among other measures. In addition to case-based interventions that more actively identify and isolate people with the disease and their contacts, the public will initially be asked to limit gatherings, and people will initially be asked to wear fabric nonmedical face masks while in the community to reduce their risk of asymptomatic spread. Those who are sick will be asked to stay home and seek testing for COVID-19. Testing should become more widespread and routine as point-of-care diagnostics are fully deployed in doctors’ offices.
While we focus on state-by-state reopening of activities in a responsible manner and based on surveillance data, we note that states may move forward at a county or regional level if these conditions vary within the state and that coordination on reopening among states that share metropolitan regions will be necessary.
Establish Immune Protection and Lift Physical Distancing During Phase III. Physical distancing restrictions and other Phase II measures can be lifted when safe and effective tools for mitigating the risk of COVID-19 are available, including broad surveillance, therapeutics that can rescue patients with significant disease or prevent serious illness in those most at risk, or a safe and effective vaccine.
Rebuild Our Readiness for the Next Pandemic in Phase IV. After we successfully defeat COVID-19, we must ensure that America is never again unprepared to face a new infectious disease threat. This will require investment into research and development initiatives, expansion of public-health and health care infrastructure and workforce, and clear governance structures to execute strong preparedness plans. Properly implemented, the steps described here also provide the foundation for containing the damage that future pathogens may cause.
Goals
The goal of Phase I is to save lives by:
A successful Phase I will allow for a significant relaxation of physical distancing measures and a progression to Phase II, when more targeted, case-based interventions are possible.
Thresholds for Action
Trigger to Begin to “Slow the Spread.” The trigger to implement nationwide “slow the spread” measures2 in Phase I is the existence in multiple geographic locations around the country of confirmed cases that cannot be traced back to other known cases (“community spread”).3 This trigger has already been reached in the United States.
Trigger to Move to Phase II. To guard against the risk that large outbreaks or epidemic spread could reignite once we lift our initial efforts to “slow the spread,” the trigger for a move to Phase II should be when a state reports a sustained reduction in cases for at least 14 days (i.e., one incubation period); and local hospitals are safely able to treat all patients requiring hospitalization without resorting to crisis standards of care4; and the capacity exists in the state to test all people with COVID-19 symptoms, along with state capacity to conduct active monitoring of all confirmed cases and their contacts.5
Stay-at-Home Advisories
The trigger for issuing a stay-at-home advisory6 in a US state is when case counts are doubling every three to five days7 (based on the current New York experience) or when state and local officials recommend it based on the local context (for example, growth on track to overwhelm the health system’s capacity).
The trigger for issuing a recommendation to step down from a stay-at-home-advisory back to “slow the spread” is when the number of new cases reported in a state has declined steadily for 14 days (i.e., one incubation period) and the jurisdiction is able to test everyone seeking care for COVID-19 symptoms.
Steps Required in Phase I
Maintain Physical Distancing. Each state must maintain community-level physical distancing measures8 until the threshold for moving to Phase II is met. These Phase I measures include:
Increase Diagnostic Testing Capacity and Build Data Infrastructure for Rapid Sharing of Results. Same-day, point-of-care diagnostic testing (widely available in outpatient settings) is crucial for identifying cases, including those with asymptomatic and mild infections. To move from community-wide interventions that focus on large populations to case-based interventions that target and isolate individual people who are infected, capacity should be sufficient to test:
We estimate that a national capacity of at least 750,000 tests per week would be sufficient to move to case-based interventions when paired with sufficient capacity in supportive public-health infrastructure (e.g., contact tracing).9 In conjunction with more widespread testing, we need to invest in new tools to make it efficient for providers to communicate test results and make data easily accessible to public-health officials working to contain future outbreaks.
Ensure Functioning of the Health Care System. Ensure sufficient critical-care capacity10 in hospitals to be able to immediately expand capacity from 2.8 critical-care beds per 10,000 adults to 5–7 beds per 10,000 adults in the setting of an epidemic or other emergency, allowing for regional variation.11 This target is a minimum, must be adequate for the current and forecasted level of demand, and must be accompanied by adequate staffing. Regional variation in capacity reflecting local needs is acceptable.
Expand access to ventilators in hospitals from 3 per 10,000 adults to a goal of 5–7 ventilators per 10,000 adults.12 This target does not include transport or anesthesia machines. This target is a minimum, must be adequate for the current and forecasted level of demand, and must be accompanied by adequate staffing. Regional variation in capacity reflecting local needs is acceptable.
Maintain access to acute-care hospital beds of at least 30 per 10,000 adults.13 Facilities should have a plan, in the case of a surge in hospital demand, for how the beds would be rapidly flexed from more discretionary uses (e.g., elective procedures) and adequately staffed, with access to adequate supplies of oxygen and other medical supplies.
This health care functioning target would also be met if critical-care and ventilator capacity does not expand to that level but COVID-19 incidence is maintained or falls meaningfully below the state’s capacity to meet critical-care demand. These capacity targets can also be partially met through the availability of ample mobile health care infrastructures (supported and perhaps maintained by federal or state governments) that can be distributed and set up on short notice to hot areas with surge capacity needs.
Increase Supply of Personal Protective Equipment. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) recommends, at a minimum, N95 respirators for hospital staff expected to have direct contact with COVID-19 patients, plus disposable procedural or surgical masks for all other clinical personnel in any health care setting.14 The supply chain should be able to reliably distribute sufficient N95 masks, gloves, and other personal protective equipment to protect health care workers from infection.
Implement Comprehensive COVID-19 Surveillance Systems. The move toward less restrictive physical distancing could precipitate another period of acceleration in case counts. Careful surveillance will be needed to monitor trends in incidence. A high-performing disease surveillance system should be established that leverages:
ILINet, the surveillance system for influenza-like illness in the United States, is a potential model for SARS-CoV-2 surveillance. To enable rapid and more effective detection and case management, SARS-CoV-2 surveillance will also benefit from data sharing and coordination with health care providers and payers. The CDC should convene an intergovernmental task force, with outside experts as needed and input from states and the health care community, to develop and support a new national surveillance system and data infrastructure for tracking and analyzing COVID-19.
Massively Scale Contact Tracing and Isolation and Quarantine. When a new case of COVID-19 is diagnosed, the patient should be isolated either at home or in a hospital, depending on the level of care he or she requires. Current CDC guidelines recommend seven days of isolation.15 Home isolation can be enforced using technology such as GPS tracking on cell phone apps. Also, the close contacts of confirmed cases (as defined by the CDC16) should be quarantined and monitored daily for 14 days. Monitoring of international travelers is also recommended.17
To scale these interventions to accommodate thousands of daily cases and tens of thousands of daily contacts, public-health infrastructure will need to be dramatically scaled up throughout the country, in coordination with the improving capacity of health care providers to prevent, diagnose, and treat COVID-19 cases.
The task force should also be charged with developing and overseeing an initiative to:
Offer Voluntary Local Isolation and Quarantine. Comfortable, free facilities should be provided for cases and their contacts who prefer local isolation, quarantine, and treatment away from home. For example, a member of a large household may wish to recover in a hotel room that has been repurposed rather than risk infecting family members. Isolation and quarantine away from home should not be mandatory or compelled by force.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency is the lead agency tasked with coordinating with state and local jurisdictions to stand up appropriate isolation and quarantine facilities. Field hospitals, dormitories, hotels, and military barracks may be appropriated for this purpose.
Encourage the Public to Wear Masks. There is emerging evidence that asymptomatic and presymptomatic transmission of COVID-19 is possible,18 which complicates efforts to pursue case-based interventions. To reduce this risk during Phase I, everyone, including people without symptoms, should be encouraged to wear nonmedical fabric face masks while in public.19
Face masks will be most effective at slowing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 if they are widely used, because they may help prevent people who are asymptomatically infected from transmitting the disease unknowingly. Face masks are used widely by members of the public in some countries that have successfully managed their outbreaks, including South Korea and Hong Kong.20 The World Health Organization (WHO) recommended members of the public use face masks in the event of a severe influenza pandemic.21
However, personal protective equipment should continue to be reserved for health care workers until supplies are sufficient for them and abundant. For this reason, right now members of the general public should opt to wear nonmedical fabric face masks when going out in public. The CDC should issue guidelines on the proper design of such nonmedical fabric face masks. Consumers may be able to fashion these masks themselves using available washable materials, or they may become available in the consumer marketplace.
Trigger for Moving to Phase II
A state can safely proceed to Phase II when it has achieved all the following:
In Phase II, the majority of schools, universities, and businesses can reopen. Teleworking should continue where convenient; social gatherings should continue to be limited to fewer than 50 people wherever possible. Other local restrictions should be considered, such as those that limit people from congregating in close proximity.
High-contact settings such as schools should continue to review and implement physical distancing measures with guidance from the CDC and input from local officials. Health officials should recommend increased social hygiene measures and cleaning of shared surfaces.
For older adults (those over 60 years old), those with underlying health conditions, and other populations at heightened risk from COVID-19, it should still be recommended that they limit time in the community during Phase II. This recommendation may change if an effective therapeutic becomes available.
We need to consider these activities on a coordinated, regional basis through multistate cooperation. While state and local governments maintain sovereignty over issues related to their public-health response, coordination based on regions that cross state boundaries will be crucial. Large states with multiple urban areas and rural regions may implement reopening at a regional level. States that share major metropolitan areas (for example, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut) should assure that the conditions for reopening these areas are met across the relevant state boundaries.
Goals
The goals of Phase II are to:
The adoption of these Phase II measures will require a careful balance. We will need to constantly reevaluate the implementation of these measures based on available surveillance data, and we will need to be ready to adjust our approach over time according to the epidemiology of local, national, and global spread. This is especially true as we transition from one phase to the next.
Thresholds for Action
Trigger to Lift Physical Distancing Measures. Once the criteria for the transition from Phase I to Phase II have been met and we begin to move away from the “slow the spread” period, leaders at the state level should begin an incremental easing of physical distancing measures. This should be done gradually and should be paired with increased surveillance for new cases. State officials should make decisions about the selection and timing of restrictions to lift based on their local contexts. Restrictions should be eased gradually, with sufficient time between each adjustment to carefully monitor for resurgence of transmission.
Trigger for Returning to Phase I, “Slow the Spread.” As physical distancing is gradually eased, surveillance will be essential for quickly identifying an increase in cases in the state. A state should revert to Phase I and continue “slow the spread” if a substantial number of cases cannot be traced back to known cases, if there is a sustained rise in new cases for five days, or if hospitals in the state are no longer able to safely treat all patients requiring hospitalization.
Trigger for Moving to Phase III. Once a vaccine has been developed, has been tested for safety and efficacy, and receives FDA emergency use authorization,24 or there are other therapeutic options that can be used for preventive or treatment indications and that have a measurable impact on disease activity and can help rescue very sick patients, states can move to Phase III.
Steps Required in Phase II
Implement Case-Based Interventions. Using the public-health capacities developed in Phase I, every confirmed case should be isolated either at home, in a hospital, or (voluntarily) in a local isolation facility for at least seven days, or according to the latest CDC guidance. People awaiting test results should be advised to quarantine until their results are returned.
The close contacts of confirmed cases should be traced and placed under home or central quarantine, with active daily monitoring for at least 14 days, or according to the latest CDC guidance. Diagnostic tests should be immediately administered to any close contacts who develop symptoms.
Begin to Relax Physical Distancing Measures. General physical distancing precautions should still be the norm during Phase II, including teleworking (as much as possible), maintaining hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette, wearing a mask in public, regularly disinfecting high-touch surfaces, and initially limiting social gatherings to fewer than 50 people. These recommendations should be augmented through technological solutions to understand physical distancing behaviors and adjust risk messaging as needed. This should be accomplished through partnerships with the private sector, with careful attention paid to preserving privacy and avoiding coercive means to encourage compliance.
As children return to school and daycare (i.e., high-contact settings) and people return to high-density workplaces, leaders of these organizations should continue to review and implement physical distancing measures based on guidance from the CDC for schools and businesses.25
Special Care for Vulnerable Populations. While easing of physical distancing is taking place, highly vulnerable populations,26 such as individuals older than age 60 and those with compromised immune systems or compromised lung and heart function, should continue to engage in physical distancing as much as possible until a vaccine is available, an effective treatment is available, or there is no longer community transmission. Special attention should be paid to long-term-care facilities and nursing homes.27 These facilities will need to maintain high levels of infection prevention and control efforts and limit visitors to prevent outbreaks.
If a treatment or prophylactic, such as a monoclonal antibody,28 becomes available, high-risk and vulnerable populations should be prioritized to receive it, to both protect those individuals and reduce the likelihood of an increase in severe illnesses and additional patient surge in hospital intensive care units (ICUs).
Accelerate the Development of Therapeutics. Therapeutics play an important role in caring for those who are sick. Accelerating the research, development, production, and distribution of safe and effective therapeutics is a top priority. With effective development strategies and early investments in commercial-scale manufacturing, a successful therapeutic could receive emergency use authorization or approval as early as the summer or fall, if trials demonstrate that it meets either standard.
Therapeutics can serve a number of roles. First, they can serve as a prophylaxis to help prevent infection in those at greatest risk of infection, such as front-line health care workers, or those at risk of bad outcomes, such as individuals with preexisting health conditions and those who are immunocompromised. Such a treatment could include a recombinant antibody that can target the virus surface antigens. As an example, researchers successfully developed such a therapeutic against Ebola. These antibody drugs can also be used to treat early infection or as a postexposure prophylaxis.
Other therapeutics might include antiviral drugs that target features of how the virus replicates. These drugs can be used to treat people who are critically ill or earlier in the course of disease for those at risk of developing a complication. Antiviral drugs can also be used as postexposure prophylaxis, depending on their safety profile. Postexposure prophylaxis and products that shorten the duration and intensity of viral shedding may affect the effective reproduction number only modestly. In addition, immune-modulating treatments may prove to be helpful in mitigating severe lung complications in some patients. A number of promising drugs are in early and mid-stage development.
At a minimum, the optimal profile for a therapeutic that will affect the risk from future spread is one that meaningfully reduces the risk of death or severe disease and perhaps prevents the onset of symptoms or progression to severe disease in those exposed. Oral administration at the outpatient level would be ideal, but alternative administration requirements (e.g., infusion and jet injections) could also be scaled, with sufficient planning.
While private industry has already organized a large task force to share information and capabilities to rapidly advance promising therapies, we need a commensurate focus by federal agencies to make sure the best possible resources are brought to this mission. Federal agencies should join organized efforts already underway in the private sector.
Identify Those Who Are Immune. Serology is a method used to identify evidence of immunity in someone who has recovered from infection. With accurate and widely available serological testing, we can identify people who are immune and therefore no longer vulnerable to infection. While we need to better understand the strength of the immune response in mild cases and how long people remain immune from reinfection, we know there is a period where most people will have sufficient antibodies to offer protection. People who are immune could:
To use serology in this way, serological assays are needed and should be widely available, accurate, rapid, and low cost. Such assays have already been developed by researchers, but they have not yet been fully validated and are not available at scale.
A task force comprised of senior leaders from the CDC, the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, the Department of Defense (DOD), the FDA, academia, and key private-sector groups (e.g., serological manufacturing companies) should be tasked to oversee the development, production, distribution, data collection, serological survey designs, and analytics for use of serology at scale.29
Trigger for Moving to Phase III
Once a vaccine has been developed, has been tested for safety and efficacy, and receives FDA emergency use authorization,30 states can move to Phase III.
Once a robust surveillance sentinel system is in place, coupled with widespread point-of-care testing and a robust ability to implement tracing, isolation, and quarantines—and this is supported by the availability of therapeutics that can help mitigate the risk of spread or reduce serious outcomes in those with infections—or alternatively a vaccine has been developed and tested for safety and efficacy, we can enter Phase III. The availability of these technologies (and eventually a safe and effective vaccine) will have economic and social benefits, in addition to health benefits.
Goals
The goals of safe and effective technologies for controlling transmission are to:
Thresholds for Action
Trigger to Begin Manufacturing Scale-Up and Vaccine or Therapeutic Prioritization Planning. As soon as a vaccine or therapeutic looks promising in pivotal clinical trials (i.e., it has been shown to be safe and looks like it will also be effective),31 the US government should work with industry to begin planning for mass manufacturing, distribution, and administration. New provisions enacted under the recently passed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act allow for large-scale manufacturing of promising therapies, in advance of approval, to help make sure there will be adequate supply available for mass distribution, should a product demonstrate that it is safe and effective and win regulatory approval.
Trigger for Switch Toward Mass Vaccination. Once availability of a vaccine or therapeutic is able to meet demand, vaccination can expand beyond priority groups. The CDC, state public-health agencies, and vaccine developers should work together to plan for and execute mass vaccination of large populations in the US. This planning can begin before Phase III because preparation can be made regardless of vaccine availability.
Steps to Take in Phase III
Vaccine or Therapeutic Production. Once a safe and effective vaccine or therapeutic has been licensed, it will need to be quickly manufactured at scale. The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures enterprise,32 in coordination with pharmaceutical companies and other private-sector stakeholders, should continue to plan for and implement mass production capable of quickly meeting US demand.
Vaccine or Therapeutic Prioritization—When Supply Is Still Limited. The CDC, the National Institutes of Health, the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, the DOD, and other stakeholders should revise prior influenza vaccine prioritization guidance to apply specifically to COVID-19.33 The new prioritization guidance for the COVID-19 vaccine should identify priority groups for targeted distribution when a safe and effective vaccine starts to become available. The guidance should be transparent and explain the reasoning for priorities, including the populations in which the vaccine was studied, and should be a phased approach that expands to additional priority groups as vaccine availability expands. The guidance should be reflected in COVID-19 payment policies implemented by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and private insurers, with treatment available at no cost to individuals who meet the priority guidance and a mechanism for reimbursement for individuals who are uninsured.
Mass Vaccination or Therapeutic Distribution—When Supply Is Abundant. The CDC should work with state and local health officials, health care providers, CMS and health insurers, and other public-health stakeholders to create a national plan for how mass vaccination will be carried out across the country. This plan should identify who will administer vaccinations, where vaccines will be offered, and how data will be collected on vaccination rates, as well as possible adverse events from the vaccine. Indemnification of vaccine developers and manufacturers should also be considered. Congress could enact legislation to support a process for compensation of any individual who has an adverse event from the vaccine, which requires medical care.
Global Vaccine Scale-Up and Vaccination. The CDC, the US Agency for International Development, the State Department, and other US stakeholders should continue to work with WHO and other international organizations and national leaders to plan for how the US will assist other countries (particularly low- and middle-income countries) with obtaining vaccine and implementing mass vaccination. Support from the United States and higher-income nations will be critical for controlling the virus globally and saving lives around the world, as well as reducing the impact that future waves of the pandemic may have on the US population.
Serological Surveys to Determine Population Immunity. One key input for understanding the population at risk is the fraction of the population who have recovered and are protected against reinfection. If a sufficiently high fraction of the population has become immune either through natural recovery or vaccination, remaining restrictions can be lifted. The CDC should be the lead agency for coordinating ongoing serological surveys.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious gaps in our nation’s pandemic preparedness. COVID-19 will not be the last public-health emergency to threaten American society. We must invest in the scientific, public-health, and medical infrastructure needed to prevent, detect, and respond to the next infectious disease threat.
Develop Vaccines for Novel Viruses in Months, Not Years. In response to COVID-19 and in preparation for the next previously unidentified health threat (“Disease X”34), the United States should lead the way by setting an ambitious goal of rapidly developing medical countermeasures for novel or unknown threats in months, not years. A dedicated strategy, program, and funding will be needed to create the ability at existing agencies within the US Department of Health and Human Services and DOD to quickly develop flexible platforms and countermeasures for any type of novel pathogen.35 This strategy should include supporting flexible manufacturing capacity to scale up production to a global level in an emergency.
Modernize and Fortify the Health Care System. We must improve our hospital-bed and ICU capacity to accommodate large surges of patients through public-private partnerships, for example, by enhancing the Hospital Preparedness Program36 and the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement37 and emphasizing preparedness in federal health care programs (e.g., the CMS38 and the Department of Veterans Affairs39). We must also expand the supply chain of personal protective equipment and further the development of crisis standards of care. To reduce future burdens on our critical-care systems, we must also support our primary and community care capabilities to identify populations at elevated risk, detect cases early, and manage them at home or in the community more effectively. Health care payers have been implementing payment reforms to support better screening and population health management. Emergency supplemental payments to health care providers in the current pandemic and future health care payments should be linked to establishing better surge capacity for severe cases and stronger capabilities to partner with public-health authorities to contain outbreaks and reduce the burden on hospitals.
Establish a National Infectious Disease Forecasting Center. Given the important role of infectious disease modeling in supporting public-health decision-making, we should increase our nation’s capacity to use infectious disease modeling40 to support public-health decision-making by establishing a national infectious disease forecasting center. This permanent federal institution would function similarly to the National Weather Service, providing a centralized capability for both producing models and undertaking investigations to improve methods used to advance basic science, data science, and visualization capabilities. It would also provide decision support to public-health agencies based on modeling and analytic results.
Governance. We need to move away from a decentralized system that promotes unequal implementation of preparedness measures across the nation and toward a more coordinated execution of response. We should develop clear and effective plans for the implementation of public-health measures such as quarantine and the unification of actions made by state and local health departments. Outbreaks are matters of regional—and more typically national—concern. Preparedness for public-health emergencies should be elevated as a function in the White House, with a coordinating function analogous to the director of national intelligence.
The authors are grateful for policy input and review of the document by Anita Cicero, JD; Thomas Inglesby, MD; Eric Toner, MD; Elena Martin, MPH; Dylan George, PhD; Jason Asher, PhD; and Trevor Bedford, PhD.
Scott Gottlieb is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and was the Food and Drug Administration commissioner from 2017 to 2019. He serves on the boards of Pfizer Inc. and Illumina.
Mark McClellan, who directs the Duke-Margolis Center for Health Policy, was commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration from 2002 to 2004. He is an independent board member at Alignment Health Care, Cigna, Johnson & Johnson, and Seer. He is a co-chair of the Health Care Payment Learning and Action Network and receives advisory fees from Arsenal Capital, CRG, and Mitre.
Lauren Silvis is a senior vice president at Tempus Inc. and was previously the deputy director of the Food and Drug Administration’s medical device center and the agency’s chief of staff from 2017 to 2019.
Caitlin Rivers is an epidemiologist and assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
Crystal Watson is a health security expert and assistant professor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security.
1. White House, “15 Days to Slow the Spread,” March 16, 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread/.
2. White House, “15 Days to Slow the Spread.”
3. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “How Coronavirus Spreads,” March 4, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html.
4. Institute of Medicine, Crisis Standards of Care: Summary of a Workshop Series (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK32749/.
5. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures: Geographic Risk and Contacts of Laboratory-Confirmed Cases,” March 22, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/php/risk-assessment.html.
6. Sarah Mervosh, Denise Lu, and Vanessa Swales, “See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home,” New York Times, March 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html.
7. Qun Li et al., “Early Transmission Dynamics in Wuhan, China, of Novel Coronavirus–Infected Pneumonia,” New England Journal of Medicine 382 (March 2020): 1199–207, https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2001316.
8. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures.”
9. During the 2017–18 flu season (which was particularly severe), there were 18,000,000–27,000,000 medical visits for influenza-like illness spread out over approximately 32 weeks, averaging 562,000–844,000 visits per week. However, those visits were not evenly distributed throughout the season, and peak demand was higher, so we estimate a national capacity of approximately 750,000 would meet demand. South Korea has tested 1 in 170 people, cumulatively. To do the same, we would need to test 1.9 million people, which we could achieve in around 2.5 weeks with a capacity of 750,000/week.
10. Neil A. Halpern and Kay See Tan, “U.S. ICU Resource Availability for COVID-19,” Society of Critical Care Medicine, March 25, 2020, https://sccm.org/getattachment/Blog/March-2020/United-States-Resource-Availability-for-COVID-19/United-States-Resource-Availability-for-COVID-19.pdf.
11. Preliminary research suggests that a Wuhan-like outbreak in the United States would require 2.1 to 4.9 critical care beds per 10,000 adults. However, a majority of those beds are in use for non-COVID-19 patients requiring critical care for other conditions. We estimate that approximately 5–7 beds per 10,000 adults would accommodate both patient groups. Ruoran Li et al., “The Demand for Inpatient and ICU Beds for COVID-19 in the US: Lessons from Chinese Cities” (working paper, March 16, 2020), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.03.09.20033241v2.full.pdf.
12. Halpern and See Tan, “U.S. ICU Resource Availability for COVID-19.”
13. Halpern and See Tan, “U.S. ICU Resource Availability for COVID-19.”
14. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim Infection Prevention and Control Recommendations for Patients with Suspected or Confirmed Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Healthcare Settings,” March 19, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/infection-control/control-recommendations.html.
15. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Discontinuation of Home Isolation for Persons with COVID-19 (Interim Guidance),” March 16, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/disposition-in-home-patients.html.
16. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures.”
17. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Travelers Returning from International Travel,” March 27, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/travelers/after-travel-precautions.html.
18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Healthcare Professionals: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers,” March 22, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/faq.html.
19. Shuo Feng et al., “Rational Use of Face Masks in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Lancet, March 20, 2020, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lanres/article/PIIS2213-2600(20)30134-X/fulltext.
20. Kylie E. C. Ainslie et al., “Report 11: Evidence of Initial Success for China Exiting COVID-19 Social Distancing Policy After Achieving Containment,” Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team, March 24, 2020, https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College-COVID19-Exiting-Social-Distancing-24-03-2020.pdf.
21. World Health Organization, Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Measures for Mitigating the Risk and Impact of Epidemic and Pandemic Influenza, 2019, https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/329438/9789241516839-eng.pdf.
22. Institute of Medicine, Crisis Standards of Care.
23. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Interim US Guidance for Risk Assessment and Public Health Management of Persons with Potential Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Exposures.”
24. Feng et al., “Rational Use of Face Masks in the COVID-19 Pandemic.”
25. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Schools, Workplaces & Community Locations,” March 21, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/index.html.
26. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “People Who Are at Higher Risk for Severe Illness,” March 26, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html.
27. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Preparing for COVID-19: Long-Term Care Facilities, Nursing Homes,” March 21, 2020, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/healthcare-facilities/prevent-spread-in-long-term-care-facilities.html.
28. National Cancer Institute, “NCI Dictionary of Cancer Terms,” s.v. “monoclonal antibody,” https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/cancer-terms/def/monoclonal-antibody.
29. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Coronavirus (COVID-19),” https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html; US Department of Health and Human Services, “BARDA’s Novel Coronavirus Medical Countermeasure Portfolio,” March 25, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/emergency/events/COVID19/Pages/BARDA.aspx; National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, https://www.niaid.nih.gov/; US Department of Defense, “Coronavirus: DOD Response,” https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Spotlight/Coronavirus/; and US Food and Drug Administration, “Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/counterterrorism-and-emerging-threats/coronavirus-disease-2019-covid-19.
30. US Food and Drug Administration, “Emergency Use Authorization,” https://www.fda.gov/emergency-preparedness-and-response/mcm-legal-regulatory-and-policy-framework/emergency-use-authorization.
31. US Food and Drug Administration, “Step 3: Clinical Research,” https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-3-clinical-research#Clinical_Research_Phase_Studies.
32. US Department of Health and Human Services, “Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise,” January 29, 2020, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/mcm/phemce/Pages/default.aspx.
33. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Interim Updated Planning Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine During an Influenza Pandemic, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/pdf/2018-Influenza-Guidance.pdf.
34. World Health Organization, “Prioritizing Diseases for Research and Development in Emergency Contexts,” https://www.who.int/activities/prioritizing-diseases-for-research-and-development-in-emergency-contexts.
35. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Health Security, Vaccine Platforms: State of the Field and Looming Challenges, 2019, https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2019/190423-OPP-platform-report.pdf.
36. US Department of Health and Human Services, “Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP),” https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/hpp/Pages/default.aspx.
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38. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, “Coronavirus (COVID-19) Partner Toolkit,” March 27, 2020, https://www.cms.gov/outreach-education/partner-resources/coronavirus-covid-19-partner-toolkit.
39. US Department of Veterans Affairs, “Coronavirus FAQs: What Veterans Need to Know,” https://www.va.gov/coronavirus-veteran-frequently-asked-questions/.
40. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Center for Health Security, Modernizing and Expanding Outbreak Science to Support Better Decision Making During Public Health Crises: Lessons for COVID-19 and Beyond, 2020, https://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/our-work/pubs_archive/pubs-pdfs/2020/200324-outbreak-science.pdf.
This letter re-posted from The Richmond Times-Dispatch.
Delay tax increases until economy recovers
Editor, Times-Dispatch:
The op-ed column by Del. Dave LaRock, R-Loudoun, “We can do this; Gov. Northam can help,” was insightful and on target. One suggestion to Gov. Ralph Northam was to postpone for 12 to 18 months any legislation that imposes regulatory or financial burdens on Virginians or their businesses, including tax increases at the state or local levels. These impactful decisions should only be made after the full economic impact of the virus is known.
There are two proposed tax increases that I find hurtful: fuel taxes and tobacco taxes. Fuel taxes hurt tourism to our state, which impacts restaurants, hotels, parks, beaches, etc. These entities already have been decimated by the virus and will need help to reopen. Tobacco taxes hurt farmers, tobacco workers and convenience stores the most. Tobacco has helped Virginia’s economy for 400 years. Philip Morris USA donated an $8 million property to Richmond Public Schools and in return, the city increased taxes on cigarettes and now the state wishes to impose more. Both taxes bite the hands that help us.
The RTD’s Michael Martz reported that the General Assembly still intends to meet April 22 to take up amendments on winter session legislation. They should cancel the session and stay at home as per Northam’s own order. There is no way that Secretary of Finance Aubrey Layne, Northam chief of staff Clark Mercer or the governor himself can accurately predict where the economy will be in two weeks, much less two months. Postpone and give us a break.
Bob Putney.
Richmond.
The Second Amendment takes yet another hit in Virginia.
By: Scott D. Cosenza, Esq. April 11, 2020
This article re-posted with permission from Liberty Nation.
Ending a month’s long battle over gun rights in Virginia, Governor Northam signed five new laws on Friday. The gun control struggle started after Democrats gained control over the government in November and was settled Friday. In July, when the new laws take effect, Virginia will go from being a pro-gun jurisdiction to something far less than that. But will it be a Pyrrhic victory?
Governor Northam announced that:
We lose too many Virginians to gun violence, and it is past time we took bold, meaningful action to make our communities safer… I was proud to work with legislators and advocates on these measures, and I am proud to sign them into law. These commonsense laws will save lives.”
And if they don’t? Opposition to the laws is not just by those who would have liberty at the cost of safety, but see the new restrictions as harmful to both. Virginia Institute for Public Policy president Lynn Taylor* said, “[t]hese laws will make Virginians less safe, not more.” Her group advocates for free markets and individual liberty, and she was particularly concerned about the new “Red Flag” law.
This law, known colloquially as a red flag law, is called an Extreme Gun Violence Protection Order in Virginia. It provides for a new kind of court order that removes the gun rights of people without traditional safeguards for due process. While accused criminals have a bundle of rights to protect them from the state, these laws operate under the fiction that they are civil orders, allowing the state to run roughshod over the people. Taylor foresees a future where people are denied their fundamental rights and may act violently in response. She said the measure would “likely set off more conflict than it will cure, all the while decreasing the liberty of Virginians.”
Private Sales
Another measure prevents Virginians from selling guns to one another privately. The people will now have to get government permission and go to a gun store to complete any transfer. While these types of laws are often the easiest to sell to people outside the gun culture, in today’s lockdown society, we can easily see why they may be damaging to liberty. When the government asserts the power to require you to transfer guns only at gun stores, and then forces gun stores to remain closed, the problem becomes apparent.
Gun rights advocates have fought against the imposition of the new laws, leading a nationwide backlash against the Virginia legislature. Their efforts were not sufficient to prevent the passage of these laws, but they are far from defeated. Liberty Nation spoke with the president of the Virginia Citizens Defense League**, Philip Van Cleave, who coordinated the effort to stop the bills in the first place, claimed the legislation was an “attack on law-abiding people,” and that gun owners are sick of it. He was happy they got the worst of the legislation killed (a ban on “assault weapons”), and that what did pass was “watered down.”
The Next Battle
Now the fight will move forward on two fronts, in the courts, and the ballot box. Mr. Van Cleave went on to say that the group will be challenging much of the new legislation in court, as they plan to sue the commonwealth in short order. On the political front, the new legislators who won in November of 2019 should expect to have a much more difficult path to victory in 2021, seeking re-election. Gun rights advocates have long memories and a penchant for single-issue voting. That’s not all – the gun rights leader thinks President Trump may now see a significant bump in support for his re-election in Virginia. “They have awakened a sleeping giant.”
Other provisions passed include a one handgun per month purchase limit, new penalties for not reporting lost or stolen guns, and for allowing firearms to be unsecured in the presence of juveniles. Absent intervening action from the courts, most of these new laws become enforceable July 1.
*Ms. Taylor sits on the board of One Generation Away, the parent organization of Liberty Nation.
** The author has been a member of the VCDL
By Delegate Dave LaRock April 6, 2020
Column originally published in the Richmond Times-Dispatch
I hope you and your family are healthy and safe today. Few were prepared for what we are going through right now, but I know many of us are anxious about family members, jobs and our businesses. Despite all the bluster and politics, Virginia’s legislators are worried for both our families and yours. In considering what we can do to help Virginia make it through the COVID-19 fallout, there have been many promising suggestions.
To provide a little context, in October 1982, single-week unemployment claims spiked to an all-time high of 695,000 people — a record that even the 2008 recession failed to overturn. This was a scary time for America, but we had tough-minded people in key positions who were able to do what was necessary — Paul Volcker, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan to name a few. Because of their efforts, America was able to forego quite a bit more pain than what the late 1970s and early 1980s could have inflicted.
In the week ending March 21, 2020, a record-setting 3,341,000 Americans filed initial claims for unemployment — roughly five times the record number from 1982. The advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims for the week ending March 28 was 6,648,000. In two weeks, 10 million Americans have lost their jobs. In Virginia, 160,000 of our friends and neighbors have become unemployed in the past two weeks. Don’t misunderstand, the point of this article is not to lament over the startlingly high number of people claiming unemployment, although these numbers are indicative of where we stand right this moment.
I am writing to call on those tough-minded men and women who are prepared to do what’s necessary to get Virginia through this crisis.
The budget passed in this past General Assembly session made certain rosy assumptions that can no longer be considered reasonable. Most importantly, these assumptions led the commonwealth to forecast a 17% cumulative growth in revenue between fiscal years 2019 and 2022 — very rosy, indeed. I think we can agree that this projection is unlikely at best, if not impossible.
Virginia Secretary of Finance Aubrey Layne recently forecast that we will take a $1 billion hit to state revenues. That’s a shortfall of approximately 3%, which fits well with those reports from early March suggesting that we might see a contraction of 3% to 5% of gross domestic product (GDP). Unfortunately, those forecasts have since been updated to indicate the contraction is expected to be between 10% and 25% of GDP. At this point in time, a $1 billion shortfall in Virginia state revenues appears too optimistic.
I think you know what I am getting at here. Our biennial budget, as it stands today, is frankly impossible to fund, much less to balance. This is not the position we, as a state, want to be in, particularly considering our rainy day fund is $1.9 billion (76%) underfunded, the state pension plan is $19 billion (22%) underfunded, and four of the six state postemployment funds — known as other post-employment benefits (OPEB) — are underfunded from a low of 17% to as much as 87% (this last figure being particular to health care funding for retired teachers). What’s the solution? This might be the simplest answer of this whole mess: There are two specific actions Gov. Ralph Northam should take.
First, deal with legislation recently passed; the governor should add a re-enactment clause to any bill passed in the 2020 session that will impose additional regulatory or financial burdens on Virginians or their businesses, including any increased taxes at the state or local level.
This would mean the General Assembly will re-look at these bills in the 2021 session, once we see how our economy is faring. What might have seemed like a good idea in rosy economic times could easily intensify already tough times. Second, deal with state spending; considering the difficult times to come, the governor needs to offer amendments to begin shifting Virginia’s budget toward a preparatory stance. Specifically, state spending from the General Fund that is not essential should be made contingent on hitting specific revenue benchmarks as we move forward in the next 12 to 18 months. In other words, we spend the money we have, not the money we wish we had.
It’s time Virginia focuses on how COVID-19 is affecting our citizens first, and on our own pet projects second. Northam can make this happen and save us all an excess of heartache and anxiety. The longest economic expansion in history is over. The potential for suffering is high but preparation can help.
Multiple Mandates
The Clean Economy Act (CEA), passed March 6, essentially codifies the 100 percent carbon-dioxide-free energy goals outlined in an executive order from Gov. Ralph Northam in September 2019. It also strips the state’s utility regulators of much of their oversight authority over the regulation and approval of electric utilities and puts Virginia on the path to 100 percent renewable energy by 2050.
CEA “directs the [State Air Pollution Control Board] to adopt regulations establishing a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program to limit and reduce the total carbon dioxide emissions released by electric generation facilities, which regulations shall comply with the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative [RGGI] model rule,” the legislation states.
RGGI is a cooperative agreement between Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont to cap and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector through regulation.
Preapproval Requirements
Aside from taking Virginia into RGGI, CEA would restrict the Virginia State Corporation Commission’s (SCC) traditional authority to approve new power generation facilities, barring it from approving “any investor-owned utility to own, operate, or construct any electric generating unit that emits carbon [dioxide] as a byproduct of combusting fuel to generate electricity” until the state legislature has had a chance to review a report concerning carbon dioxide emissions being undertaken by Virginia’s Air Pollution Control Board.
The bill also requires utilities and the SCC to consider the social cost of carbon when reviewing the need for a new generation facility.
As part of the effort to meet the target of producing all the state’s electricity from sources that emit no carbon dioxide during operation by 2050, the legislation sets targets for energy storage and offshore wind. The law requires the SCC to approve a minimum of 2.4 gigawatts (Gw) of new energy storage projects by 2035 and set interim targets for storage between now and then. In addition, CEA directs the SCC to expedite the approval of 5.2 Gw of offshore wind by the end of 2034.
The CEA also requires utilities to undertake programs, overseen by the SCC, to reduce the use of electricity by Virginians through conservation measures and programs. Under the bill, utilities should reduce their customers’ electricity use 5 percent below current levels by 2025 and maintain programs to continue reducing use thereafter.
Concerns Energy Costs
Before CEA’s final adoption, state officials warned about the cost of its renewable energy requirements to ratepayers, because offshore wind and battery storage are more expensive than traditional fossil fuel power plants or even other forms of renewable energy.
An analysis of a preliminary version of the bill conducted by the SCC concluded the typical residential household would likely see an increase of $23.30 per month on its monthly electric power bills between 2027 and 2030, solely attributable to the bill’s renewable energy requirements.
In testimony before a state Senate committee developing the bill, Attorney General Mark Herring’s (D) office expressed reservations the bill expressly calls for eliminating the SCC’s role in determining whether the “enormous costs” of implementing the bill’s provisions are reasonable and prudent and therefore can be passed on to ratepayers.
“In our view, the legislation will prevent the regulator from being able to work to accomplish the Commonwealth’s clean-energy goals in a manner consistent with ratepayer protections,” Meade Browder, a senior assistant attorney general, testified before the Senate.
Unnecessary, Premature Closures
CEA will shutter valuable power facilities with years of useful operating life remaining, all for no environmental gain, says Paul Driessen, a senior policy analyst with the Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT).
“The Virginia bill would mean tearing down numerous generating stations that have many productive years remaining, and replacing them with hundreds of gargantuan offshore wind turbines, solar installations totaling several times the land area of Washington, D.C., and tens of thousands of Tesla-style backup batteries,” Driessen said. “The price of electricity for air conditioning, computing, cooking, heating, lighting, recharging cell phones and other mobile devices, refrigeration, and other costs will skyrocket for businesses, charitable organizations, churches, families, factories, government agencies, hospitals, and schools.
“The renewable energy technologies would require millions of tons of antimony, carbon fiberglass composites, concrete, copper, rare-earth elements, steel, and other raw materials mined on the cheap overseas with little attention to U.S. laws, regulations, or ethical standards for child labor, workplace safety, fair wages, air and water pollution, wildlife preservation, or mined land reclamation,” Driessen said.
‘Unregulated Corporate Protectionism’
Passage of the CEA reverses progress the legislature had been making to defend ratepayers from monopolistic practices, says Lynn Taylor, president of the Virginia Institute for Public Policy.
“This year there have been a number of promising bipartisan efforts within the General Assembly to regain control of the regional energy monopolies in Virginia,” Taylor said. “In lieu of reasonable reform, the legislature chose to support unregulated corporate protectionism.
“Virginians will ultimately be saddled with the environmental and financial costs of the governor’s poorly conceived ‘clean power’ act for years to come,” Taylor said. “In the long run, a dramatic expansion of nuclear power in Virginia may be the only fragmented solution to serious problems exacerbated by this act.”
Bonner R. Cohen, Ph.D. ([email protected]) is a senior fellow at the National Center for Public Policy Research and a senior policy analyst with CFACT.
This research brief is republished with permission from CATO Institute.
February 19, 2020
By Mark Hoekstra and Vijetha Koppa
From 2000 to 2018, 20 states enacted voter identification requirements, bringing the total to 34 states. The most pronounced shift has been toward strict voter identification. While no states had such laws in 2000, 10 states had enacted (and sustained) such laws as of 2018. Under strict requirements, a vote is counted only if the voter produces a photo ID (in seven states) or nonphoto ID (in three states) within a specified period. These laws are controversial and have come under immense public and legal scrutiny. Proponents argue that these laws are necessary for protecting the election process from fraud and note that identification is required for other normal life activities. Critics argue that voter impersonation fraud is rare and that the laws are designed to disenfranchise low‐income and minority voters. They also note that as many as 11 percent of American adults lack a valid photo ID required to vote and argue that there are significant costs and impediments associated with acquiring a valid ID. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the potential effects of these strict voter identification laws on voter turnout and election outcomes
Assessing the causal impact of these laws is difficult for multiple reasons. The infrequency of elections, the recent enactment of these laws, and the fact that the vast majority of prospective voters have IDs make it difficult to evaluate the effects. In addition, ongoing legal challenges muddy the waters. For example, Texas’s strict voter law was enacted in May of 2011, struck down by a federal court in August of 2012, reinstated in June of 2013, struck down again in October of 2014, reinstated five days later, and ultimately struck down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in July of 2016. In 2017, Texas passed a nonstrict version of the law in which a voter without an ID could cast a provisional ballot and have it counted by signing an affidavit, bringing an end to the seven‐year‐long litigation. While Texas is perhaps an extreme example, the general legal ambiguity of these laws raises questions as to whether voters correctly perceived whether the law was in effect and what the law required.
To overcome these challenges, we take a novel approach toward addressing these laws’ impact on turnout and election outcomes. Rather than attempt to identify effects using a typical policy evaluation methodology, we carefully document how many people vote without IDs in states that do not (yet) have strict voter identification laws. Specifically, we use administrative voting records from Michigan and Florida to identify the size of the voting population that potentially could be either fraudulent (if you believe the laws’ proponents) or disenfranchised (if you believe the critics). Both Michigan and Florida have nonstrict voter identification laws, which means they ask for IDs from voters but have provisions through which votes may be cast and counted without voters actually producing IDs. Michigan counts votes cast by voters without IDs after they sign legal affidavits regarding their identities at the polls. Florida allows voters without IDs to cast provisional ballots and then counts the ballots if their signatures at the polls match those on their voter registration forms. Importantly for this study, because of these provisions, both states track the number of ballots cast by individuals who did not have IDs.
Using these data, we are able to record the number of votes cast by individuals without IDs. In doing so, we identify the maximum number of votes cast that might not have been cast and counted if a strict voter ID law were passed in these states. This enables us to show, under a variety of conservative assumptions, the maximum extent to which a strict voter ID law would reduce turnout or affect election outcomes. The strength of this approach is that it enables us to estimate the impact of a strict voter identification requirement without relying on assumptions regarding the counterfactual. In contrast, we identify clear upper bounds of the effect of the law on both turnout and election outcomes. We view this as the central contribution of our study.
The limitations of this approach are twofold. While we can clearly identify effects for potential laws if they are passed in the (large) states of Michigan and Florida, it is an open question as to whether the results would extend to other states. In particular, our results are most relevant for the more than 20 states that already have some voter identification laws in place; we would expect our results to be less relevant for the minority of states that have no voter identification requirements. In addition, while we expect our approach to overestimate effects, given that some people without an ID would acquire one if a law were passed, we do not account for effects on voters who already have the necessary ID. For example, we will not capture effects on those who falsely perceive that the law affects their ability to vote or those who are more likely to vote because they perceive an improvement in election integrity.
Results indicate that there is little scope for strict voter identification laws to affect voter turnout. This finding stems directly from the extremely small number of votes cast by individuals without IDs, even in settings where such votes are explicitly allowed and counted. Specifically, we show that a voter identification law would reduce turnout by no more than 0.06 percent in Florida and 0.2 percent in Michigan. This suggests that at least in these two states, very few voters without IDs choose to vote even when they can.
Unsurprisingly, the small effects on turnout imply that there are very few elections in our sample that could have been affected by a strict voter ID law. Even under the most extreme assumption — that all votes for the winner (and none for the runner‐up) cast without an ID would be excluded under strict law — we estimate that a strict law could have changed the outcome in fewer than 0.35 percent of local elections and 0.09 percent of state and national elections in Florida. Similarly, we show that fewer than 0.55 percent of state and national elections in Michigan could have been affected. Estimates under more reasonable assumptions result in even smaller (and likely more accurate) potential electoral impacts. In short, the evidence presented here indicates that even if the worst fears of critics or proponents were true — that all those who would have voted without IDs are fraudulent or that all would be disenfranchised — it would have at most a tiny effect on election turnout and outcomes.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to use administrative data to carefully document the number of voters who voted without IDs and the number of elections that could potentially be affected by strict voter identification laws. In doing so, it complements two other strands of literature on voter identification laws. The first has focused on estimating the number of people in the general population who lack the identification necessary to satisfy strict voter identification laws. Estimates are generally nontrivial, giving rise to concern about these laws’ potential effects. A national survey reports that nearly 7 percent of U.S. citizens did not have ready access to documents providing proof of citizenship and that as many as 11 percent of citizens lacked government‐issued photo identification. Studies have also documented that the lack of identification is concentrated among those who are low‐income, female (often due to name change after marriage), elderly, African American, or Hispanic. Similarly, the American National Elections Studies indicates that 7 percent of citizens lack a government‐issued photo ID. The estimates in this paper do not necessarily imply that those estimates are overstated. Rather, it is possible that the vast majority of individuals without identification do not vote even in the absence of a strict ID requirement. This could be because they have little interest in voting or because they mistakenly believe that their vote will not be counted if they do not have an ID despite efforts by the states to make it clear that the votes count. Regardless, our results indicate that a change from a nonstrict voter ID law to a strict law — the margin over which the most‐serious legal challenges have been raised — is unlikely to have a meaningful effect on voter turnout or election outcomes.
In addition, our paper also contributes to the literature that uses policy evaluation methodologies to identify the effects of these laws. Results from those studies are mixed, with some finding increased turnout and others finding significant declines. The advantage of our approach relative to these studies is that we can assess the prospective effects of the laws without making assumptions about the counterfactual.
Our results suggest that the practical importance of strict voter identification laws is likely overstated. Specifically, our findings indicate that unless voters without identification in other states vote at much higher rates than their counterparts in Michigan and Florida or unless the laws affect the voting of citizens who have IDs, the passage of these laws is unlikely to affect voting behavior and election outcomes.
NOTE:
This research brief is based on Mark Hoekstra and Vijetha Koppa, “Strict Voter Identification Laws, Turnout, and Election Outcomes,” NBER Working Paper no. 26206, August 2019, https:// www.nber.org/papers/w26206.
Republished with permission from CATO Institute.
March 11, 2020
In today’s Washington Examiner, Lindsey Killen of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy and Naomi Lopez of the Goldwater Institute draw attention to the archaic Certificate of Need Laws (CON laws) that continue to exist in 38 states. These state laws, promoted by the National Health Planning and Resource Act of 1974, were intended to reduce health care costs by eliminating redundancy in health care delivery systems. They vary from state to state, but essentially require a panel to review any plans by hospitals or other health care organizations to expand, build new hospitals, or in some cases, add equipment. The review panels include incumbent health care organizations. Imagine a CON law for restaurants that empanels existing restaurant owners to review applications by persons wishing to build a new restaurant or expand the capacity or offerings of an existing one. It doesn’t take long to understand how that turns into an incumbent protection law. By the early 1980s it became clear, as in all cases of central planning, that CON laws were doing nothing to reduce health care costs and may have had the opposite effect. The federal law was repealed during the Reagan Administration.
More than 3 decades after repeal of the federal law, CON laws persist in 38 states and attempts to reform or repeal them are often met by fierce resistance from incumbents who try to make the case that they only have the interests of the general public in mind. If the expected surge in COVID-19 cases exceeds the capacity of hospitals and emergency rooms, resulting in avoidable deaths, at least some of the blame belongs to CON laws, an example of central planning reminiscent of the “5‑year plans” of the Soviet politburo.
Killen and Lopez alert readers to a paper released last week by the Goldwater Institute’s Christina Sandefur, entitled “Competitor’s Veto: State Certificate of Need Laws Violate State Prohibitions on Monopolies,” that makes the case that, in addition to the economic and public health consequences of these outdated laws, CON laws violate state constitutions.
A public health crisis such as the one that now confronts us provides an opportunity to review and repeal laws and regulations that impede preparedness. Certificate of Need Laws are low hanging fruit.